Washington Law Review
Volume 51

Number 1

11-1-1975

Indian Treaty Analysis and Off-Reservation Fishing Rights: A Case
Study
Richard A. Finnigan

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons, and the Natural Resources Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard A. Finnigan, Comment, Indian Treaty Analysis and Off-Reservation Fishing Rights: A Case Study,
51 Wash. L. Rev. 61 (1975).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol51/iss1/4

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

INDIAN TREATY ANALYSIS AND
OFF-RESERVATION FISHING RIGHTS:
A CASE STUDY
In United States v. Washington,' Federal District Court Judge
Boldt held that treaties 2 negotiated in the 18'50's by Territorial Governor Isaac Stevens, on behalf of the federal government, reserved to
the Indians of western Washington 3 the right to fish off reservation for
salmon and steelhead 4 in their "usual and accustomed places." 5 These
treaties stated that the right is to be exercised "in common with ' 6 nonIndian fishermen. In a critical examination of precedent which clarified much of the prior uncertainty concerning Indian treaty analysis,
Judge Boldt interpreted this treaty language to require that the Indians be given an opportunity to harvest 50 percent of the salmon and
steelhead runs.7 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
8
Judge Boldt's decision.
1. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), affd and remanded, 520 F.2d 676
(9th Cir. 1975).
2. The following treaties were involved: Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854,
10 Stat. 1132 (1854); Treaty of Point Elliot, Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927 (1859);
Treaty of Point No Point, Jan. 26, 1855, 12 Stat. 933 (1859); Treaty with the Makah
Tribe, Jan. 31, 1855, 12 Stat. 939 (1859); Treaty with the Yakimas, June 9, 1855,
12 Stat. 951 (1859); Treaty with the Quinault, et at. (Treaty of Olympia), July 1,
1855, Jan. 25, 1856, 12 Stat. 971 (1859). The salient provisions of these treaties are
virtually identical.
3. The court defined this area as "that portion of the State of Washington west of
the Cascade Mountains and north of the Columbia River drainage area, [including]
the American portion of the Puget Sound watershed, the watersheds of the Olympic
Peninsula north of the Grays Harbor watershed, and the off-shore waters adjacent to
those areas." 384 F. Supp. at 328. Involved were the treaty fishing rights of the Hoh,
Makah, Muckleshoot, Nisqually, Puyallup, Quileute, Skokomish, Lummi, Quinault,
Sauk-Suiattle, Squaxin Island, Stillaguamish, and Upper Skagit River tribes and the
Yakima Nation. Id. at 327 nn.l & 2.
4. The decision actually applied to all "anadromous fish," which the court defined as
[a] ny fish which spawns or is artificially produced in freshwater, reaches mature
size while rearing in saltwater and returns to freshwater to reproduce, and which
spends any portion of its life cycle in waters within the Western District of Washington.
384 F. Supp. at 405.
5. See text accompanying note 13 infra.
6. Id.
7. 384 F. Supp. at 343. The right was stated as an opportunity to harvest, not as
an absolute right to, 50% of the run. The run was defined in terms of harvestable
fish: ' The approximate number of anadromous fish which is surplus beyond adequate
production escapement and Indian needs as defined in the Decision; that is, the number remaining when the adequate production escapement and Indian needs are subtracted from the run size." Id. at 405. Indian needs are defined as those catches occurring on reservations, or for ceremonial or consumption purposes. See notes 147-48
and accompanying text infra.
8. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
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In reaching his conclusions, Judge Boldt emphasized the sociological, historical and political background of the treaty signings and the
evolution of the controversy, as well as legal precedent. This comment
will examine the district court's decision in Washington by analyzing
the factors involved in and the legal history of Indian treaty interpretation in the context of an off-reservation activity, and by focusing
upon the mode of analysis employed by Judge Boldt. Initially, a brief
review of the historical background of the controversy will be useful
in understanding the decision.
I.

NORTHWEST INDIAN TREATY FISHING RIGHTS
HISTORY IN A NUTSHELL 9

Before the arrival of white men in the Pacific Northwest, salmon
were a central element in the culture of the Indians; the fish were a
part of their spiritual life, were vital to their physical well-being, and
served as a basis of their pre-capitalistic economy. The pre-treaty Indians of western Washington traveled to favored fishing grounds in
family units during the spring, summer and autumn runs and returned
to traditional tribal grounds to winter.' 0 The role of salmon in Indian
culture changed slowly with the influx of white civilization in the Pacific Northwest.
The first major change came with the signing of treaties. In order to
smooth the path for the arrival of white settlers, Isaac Stevens, the first
governor of Washington Territory, signed treaties involving 17,000
western Washington Indians within a few months. 1 Early in the negotiations Stevens discovered that it was almost impossible to obtain Indian signatures without guaranteeing that the right to fish would remain undisturbed.' 2 To that end, the following language, or language
9. For a detailed description of the history of Indian treaty fishing rights in the
Pacific Northwest, see AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY:

FISHING RIGHTS OF THE MUCKLESHOOT, PUYALLUP, AND NISQUALLY INDIANS
[hereinafter cited as UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY]. See also United States v.
Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 350-58.

(1971)

10. 384 F. Supp. at 350-51.
11. UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 9, at 19. Negotiations were carried on
primarily in Chinook, a 300-word trading jargon. Id. at 23. Considering that the
average child of two has a vocabulary of nearly 300 words and that the average child
of five has a vocabulary of about 5,000 words, the communication of complex concepts was not likely. See R. ENGLE, LANGUAGE MOTIVATING EXPERIENCES FOR YOUNG
CHILDREN (1971).
12. UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 9, at 21.

Indian Treaty Fishing Rights
substantially similar, was incorporated in the treaties:13 "The right of
taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the Territory . . . ." Once the treaties were signed and reservations established, settlers rushed in to stake claims on the ceded land.
During the early reservation years, fish were abundant and the only
commercial exploitation of salmon was carried on by the Indians as
part of their trading activities. However, as white civilization expanded, pressures increased on the once thriving salmon runs. Industrial pollution, logging operations and dam construction depleted
spawning beds and salmon runs. Commercial fishing technology became more efficient and exploitation of the runs increased. The development of the hatchery system and advances in fisheries science and
resource management were unable to keep pace with these pres14
sures.
While this occurred, efforts were directed toward making farmers
of the Indians. 15 Nonetheless, the Indians remained primarily fishermen. 16 Thus, as the salmon resource diminished, conflicts arose.
The Indians maintained that a reserved right to fish off reservation
was guaranteed by treaty. On the other hand, the state, through its
Department of Fisheries and Department of Game, steadfastly adhered to the position that off-reservation fishing7 was subject to complete state regulation, as was non-Indian fishing.'
These conflicts resulted in a history of state seizures of Indian
fishing nets and equipment, or their destruction by sportsmen, culminating in a series of armed confrontations in the 1960's.18 The parties
struck militant positions. Against this backdrop, Judge Boldt was
asked to apply the dry aesthetics of legal principle. Lacking the guid13.

The quoted language is from the Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854,

art. III, para. 1, 10 Stat. 1132 (1854), cited in United States v. Washington, 384 F.
Supp. at 331.
14. See UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supranote 9, Ch. VI.

15.
16.

Id. at 41-42.
384F.Supp. at 357.

17.

See UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 9, at 125-37. As a practical matter,

the state's position is not surprising. Most of the electorate is non-Indian, and the
state benefits economically from both commercial and recreational non-Indian fishing.
For instance, according to a study relied upon by the Department of Game, a sports-

man generates $60 in the local economy for each steelhead caught. 382 F. Supp. at 399.
18. The controversy resulted in national publicity during this period. Among the
more unusual stories was the March 1964 arrest of actor Marion Brando for illegally
fishing in the Puyallup River. See generally UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 9,

Ch. V.
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ance of clear and precise doctrine, Judge Boldt was forced to wind his
way through 200 years of judicial uncertainty and misstatement. To
facilitate analysis of the historical setting, it is useful to explore the
principles involved in Indian treaty interpretation.
II.

PRINCIPLES OF INDIAN TREATY INTERPRETATION

A.

The ConstitutionalSignificance of Indian Treaties

The basic constitutional principles applicable to all treaties provide
the starting point for analysis of Indian treaties. While economic, political and social changes within the United States influence treaty interpretation, Indian treaties remain part of the supreme law of the
land under the Constitution.' 9 As the eminent scholar on Indian law,
Felix Cohen, noted: "One who attempts to survey the legal problems
raised by Indian treaties must at the outset dispose of the objection
that such treaties are somehow of inferior validity or are of purely
antiquarian interest. '2 0 Thus, Indian treaties are of the same dignity
as treaties with foreign states.
This basic proposition is clearly evidenced in the negotiations of
early treaties, which were conducted from the viewpoint of mutual
sovereignty. 2 1 For example, many early treaties included mutual
assistance pacts and language reserving and granting to each party
mutual rights and privileges. 2 2 Further support exists in early congressional use of the ratification process2 3 and in the opinions of the
Supreme Court declaring Indian treaties to have been negotiated between sovereigns. 24 Cohen has stated: "[G] enerally speaking, the

19.

U.S. CONST. art. VI.

20.

F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 3 (1942) [hereinafter cited as COHEN].

21.

See Mickenberg, Aboriginal Rights in Canada and the United States, 9 Os119 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Mickenberg]. See also Kawashima, Legal Origins of the Indian Reservation in Colonial Massachusetts, 13 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 42 (1969); Kerr, Constitutional Rights, Tribal Justice, and the American Indian, 18 J. PUB. L. 311 (1969); Oliver, The Legal Status of American Indian
Tribes, 38 ORE. L. REV. 193 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Oliver]; Schaub, Indian
Industrial Development and the Courts, 8 NAT. RESOURCE J. 303 (1968); Comment,
The Indian Battlefor Self-Determination, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 445 (1970).
GOODE HALL L. REV.

22.

See generally COHEN, supra note 20, at 39-40.

23. See generally id., at 34.
24. See notes 54-62 and accompanying text infra. See also McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), and Oneida Indian Nation v. County
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incidents attaching to a treaty with a foreign power have been held
'2 5
applicable to Indian treaties.
B.

FederalPre-emptionand Preclusion

Under our system of federalism, there are certain areas of jurisdiction from which the states are precluded. These areas are vested exclusively in the province of federal jurisdiction under the Constitution.
For example, the states do not have the power to enter into treaties
with foreign governments. 2 6 There are also areas subsumed within the
tenth amendment which are exclusively the province of state governments.27 There is also a third area, one of overlap.
If jurisdictional power is not exclusively vested in the federal government but is within the range of permissible federal regulation, there
is dual jurisdiction. The states may regulate the area until pre-empted
of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974). Cohen has summarized the significance of judicial
recognition of tribal sovereignty as follows:
The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian tribal powers is
marked by adherence to three fundamental principles: (1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all powers of any sovereign state. (2) Conquest renders
the tribe subject to the legislative power of the United States ... but does not by
itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe .... (3) These powers are subject
to qualification by treaties and by express legislation by Congress ....
COHEN, supra note 20, at 123.
25. COHEN, supra note 20, at 34. Because it is significant that Article VI governs
Indian treaties, these incidents warrant summarization. The U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2
vests the treaty making power in the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate and subjects proposed treaties to ratification by two-thirds of the Senate. To
implement the basic proposition that treaties are the supreme law of the land, the
Supreme Court has held that states are subject to and must comply with duly negotiated treaties. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In addition, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10 prohibits states from entering into treaties. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). Treaties remain the supreme law of the land until
modified by mutual consent or until abrogated by congressional legislation. Therefore,
subsequent congressional legislation is controlling. See Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (Chinese person denied re-entry to United States despite
certificate authorizing re-entry pursuant to United States-Chinese treaty because Congress had subsequently revoked the certificate). See also The James G. Swan, 50 F. 108
(D. Wash. 1892) (Indian treaties are subject to modification by later treaties). It is
also important to note that while subsequent federal legislation may abrogate the
terms of a treaty, abrogation by implication is not favored. See, e.g., Menominee
Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968); United States v. Payne, 264 U.S.
446, 449 (1924); United States v. Le Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 221 (1902). This
may have an important impact on later development of Pacific Northwest Indian treaty
fishing rights. See note 158 infra.
26. U.S. CoNrsT. art. II, § 2, and art. I, § 10.
27. " [T] he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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by comprehensive federal regulation. 28 If the federal government does
not occupy the area completely, the states may regulate to an extent
29
and in a manner not inconsistent with existing federal regulation.
The importance of these concepts lies in the Supreme Court's approach which deals with off-reservation Indian treaty rights from a
standpoint of federal pre-emption. The appropriateness of this doctrinal development will be discussed below.
C.

Indian Treaties: Concepts and Confusion

There are two principles of Indian treaty interpretation which are
unquestioned: (1) ambiguities are resolved in favor of the Indian
tribes; (2) doubtful clauses are resolved in a nontechnical way as the
Indian tribes would have understood the language. 30 Both principles
flow from the proposition that all powers which are lawfully vested in
an Indian tribe are not delegated powers granted by express acts of
31
Congress, but inherent powers which never have been extinguished.
28. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). This case involved the
Smith Act and a state statute proscribing sedition. The Court held that the (federal)
Smith Act so occupied the field that the state act was superseded. See also Free v.
Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) (state law governing validity of survivorship clause of
U.S. savings bonds must give way to Treasury regulations); New York Cent. Ry. v.
Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917) (Brandeis, J.. dissenting) (recovery from railroad by
injured employee under state law barred because federal law governing such injuries
is comprehensive).
29. See, e.g., Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962) (Bankruptcy Act does not preclude state from attaching consequences it wishes to debt
which has been discharged); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit. 362 U.S. 440
(1960) (local ordinance governing smoke emissions is enforceable against vessels
engaged in interstate commerce because ordinance not in conflict with federal navigation regulations); Allen-Bradley Local 1I I I v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd.. 315 U.S. 740 (1942) (state can regulate mass picketing notwithstanding National
Labor Relations Act); Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940) (state statute governing highway safety standards enforceable because ICC had not set such standards).
30. COHEN, supra note 20, at 37. These principles can be formulated another
way. (1) Treaties with the Indians must be interpreted as the Indians would have
understood them. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970); United
States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938); Starr v. Long Jim, 227 U.S. 613,
623-24 (1913); Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). The
rationale for this proposition, according to the Supreme Court in Jones v. Meehan.
175 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1899). is the unequal bargaining abilities of the parties, the use
of federal interpreters for the Indian tribes, and the use of the English language to
preserve the treaty terms in writing. (2) Doubtful expressions are to be resolved in
favor of the Indian tribes. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n., 411 U.S. 164,
174 (1973); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908). (3) Treaties should be construed liberally in favor
of the Indian tribes. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943);
Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 685 (1942).
31. COHEN, supra note 20, at 122.
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Neither principle, however, is applied in derogation of any treaty conditions or requirements of equity or substantial justice. 32 Beyond these
two procedural principles, the interpretation of Indian treaties is a
doctrinal jungle.
The legal status of rights reserved 33 under Indian treaties should be
resolved according to the principles applicable to all duly negotiated
treaties. The unique geographical status of Indian tribes has, however,
caused Congress, the courts and the states concern. To resolve this
problem, various parties have advanced and employed a number of
themes. Because the indiscriminate use of these themes has been a significant cause of the confusion reigning over interpretation of Indian
treaties, it is important that they be clearly delineated.
One theme concerns the battle over jurisdiction. The federal government desires to retain jurisdiction over areas committed to it under
the Constitution. These areas include power to regulate commerce
with the Indian tribes, 34 exclusive control over treaty making, 35 and
power to regulate federal property 36 and make war.3 7 The states have
been particularly hesitant to recognize Indian nations as sovereigns
and Indian treaties as the supreme law of the land because they have
been anxious to establish control over the people and activities within

their territorial

3

limits. 8

Since the states granted plenary power to the

federal government, their jurisdictional claims over Indian activities

32.

Id. Cohen quotes from Justice Harlan's opinion in United States v. Choctaw

Nation, 179 U.S. 494 (1900): "But in no case has it been adjudged that the courts
could by mere interpretation or in deference to its [sic] view as to what was right
under all the circumstances, incorporate into an Indian treaty something that was
inconsistent with the clear import of its words." Id. at 532.
33. The usual construction is that treaties reserve rather than grant rights to the
Indians. This is a further manifestation of sovereignty. See Johnson, The States Versus
Indian Off-Reservation Fishing: A United States Supreme Court Error, 47 WASH. L.

REV. 207 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Johnson]; Comment, The Indian Battle for
Self-Determination, supra note 21. Contra, Comment, Indian Hunting and Fishing

Rights, 10 ARIZ. L. REV. 725 (1968).
34.

U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10.

35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8 and art. I, § 10. The commerce and treaty making
powers were considered by Chief Justice Marshall to "comprehend all that is required
for regulation of our intercourse with the Indians." Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). For a summarization of the incidents of treaty making
power, see note 25 supra.

36. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. This power extends over Indian tribes to the
extent they reside, or prior to treaty signing resided, on land in the public domain.
See COHEN, supra note 20, at 94.
37. U.S. CONST. Preamble.
38. See note 17 supra.
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depend upon either inherent sovereign power 3 9 or grants of jurisdiction from the federal government. 40 Finally, the Indian tribes maintain a treaty-based jurisdictional claim over reservation affairs, as well
41
as over all reserved rights, whether exercised on or off reservation.
In balancing the competing jurisdictional claims of the three parties, the courts have advanced two major doctrines as the raison d'etre
for particular determinations of Indian treaty rights: Indian tribal
sovereignty 42 and Indian wardship. 43 Indian tribal sovereignty is the
39. This concept is that the power to regulate and control activity within its territorial boundaries inheres in the state. The states have extrapolated their claim of
inherent sovereignty as a basis for exercising jurisdiction over Indian tribes in a
number of ways. One use of the concept is the combination of discoverer's title (the
method of determining European nations' ownership of new land based upon the
discoveries of commissioned explorers) and the equal footing doctrine (the theory
that all states enter the union on an equal footing with the original thirteen). According to this argument, complete title to a land vested in a European nation by the act
of discovery. This title moved among the European nations by conflict or negotiation, and from England to the original states upon the success of the American Revolution. The states then gave to the federal government only those powers contained in
the Constitution. Since the states retained title to the land, those activities within
state territorial boundaries and not under the umbrella of federal legislation enacted
pursuant to the Constitution remained subject to state jurisdiction. Under the equal
footing doctrine, all states succeeded to the same elements of title. Thus, the states
have claimed a right to regulate off-reservation treaty hunting and fishing rights based
upon their inherent sovereign control over wildlife within their borders. See, e.g.,
State v. McCoy, 63 Wn. 2d 421, 434-39. 387 P.2d 942, 950-53 (IQ63).
This doctrine is historically, as well as theoretically, inaccurate. First, discoverer's
title was merely a method of determining claims to ownership among the European
community of nations. It did not purport to reach the title claims of native inhabitants. Scholars as early as 1532 advised that it would be inaccurate to assert title as
against native inhabitants based on a claim of discoverer's title. As against native
claimants, title must be acquired by treaty or conquest. See COHEN, supra note 20.
at 46-47. See also Cohen, The Spanish Origins of Indian Rights in the Law of the
United States, 31 GEO. L.J. 1, 17 (1942), and Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN.
L. REV. 28. 43-45 (1940). Additionally. the equal footing doctrine is meant only to
preserve to the states those powers which could be exercised by the original thirteen
states. Thus, it does not encompass powers to deal with Indian tribes granted to the
federal government and enumerated in the Constitution. See notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
40. This comment is not concerned with state jurisdiction asserted under authority
of federal statute. It is clear that a federal statute can supersede treaty provisions.
See note 25 supra. Therefore, state jurisdiction asserted in compliance with such
legislation does not present a conflict. See, e.g., State ex rel. Adams v. Superior
Court, 57 Wn. 2d 181, 356 P.2d 985 (1960).
41. This claim has been analyzed by some authors in terms of state-Indian or
state-federal jurisdictional clashes. See, e.g., Burnett, Indian Hunting, Fishing and
Trapping Rights: The Record and Controversy, 7 IDAHO L. REV. 49 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Burnett].
42. For a discussion of Indian tribal sovereignty, see Mickenberg, supra note 21,
at 121-23. See also Oliver, The Legal Status of American Tribes, supra note 21;
Comment, The Indian Battle for Self-Determination, supra note 21; Comment. The
Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 1343 (1968).

43.

Part of the problem with the wardship doctrine is that courts and Congress

Indian Treaty Fishing Rights
concept that treaties were negotiated between sovereigns and that the
44
rights reserved in the treaties are under the dominion of the tribe.
The wardship doctrine views the Indian tribes as needing the beneficent protection of the federal government. A great deal of
legislation 45 is based upon the latter principle and even a few treaties

recognize it.46
Courts have tended to define and utilize these two concepts to suit
their ends. The result, as will be shown, has been the development of
inconsistent precedent and the application of legislation interpretation
principles 47 to treaties. Because federal legislation lacks the incidents
of mutual sovereignty extant in treaty negotiations, the application of
these interpretative tools to treaties creates an inherent misconception
of treaty purposes. This misconception and the conflicting jurisdictional claims of the parties underlie much of the confused history of
Indian treaty rights litigation.
HI.
A.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
INTERPRETATION OF INDIAN TREATY RIGHTS
History of Treaty Negotiation

The colonization era of the United States was characterized by the
negotiation of Indian treaties in an atmosphere of mutual military and
have utilized it to mean whatever is convenient to the result desired. See COHEN,
supra note 20, at 169-73. For purposes of this comment, wardship means an entity
in need of legal, political and social protection; it does not suggest dominance and
supplication in an international affairs context. This definition is suggested by Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). See text accompanying notes 57-61 infra.
44. Treaty rights do not belong to individual Indians, but belong to the tribe
because it negotiated the treaty. See Whitefoot v. United States, 293 F.2d 658 (Ct. CL.
1961) (Indian fishing rights held to be tribal property). However, it should also be
noted that since the passage of the Citizenship Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat.
253 (repealed 1952), all Indians are citizens of the United States and are afforded
the full protection of the Constitution.
45. See note 52 infra.
46. See, e.g., Treaty of Aug. 7, 1790, with the Creek Nation, Art. 2, 7 Stat. 35
(1848); Treaty of Aug. 13, 1803, with the Kaskaskias et al., 7 Stat. 78 (1848).
47. When implementing legislative provisions, courts often emphasize the purpose
of the legislation. Such emphasis is inappropriate to treaty interpretation because it
avoids examination of the treaty provisions in the context of negotiation between
mutual sovereigns.
The use of the wardship doctrine as an interpretive tool for legislation dealing with
Indians rests upon sounder logic. The necessary examination of congressional intent
and the assumption that state jurisdiction is appropriately asserted until precluded are
consonant with legislative, but not with treaty, analysis.
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political sovereignty. 48 The European nations faced a choice of extinguishing Indian sovereignty by treaty or conquest. The numerical superiority of the Indian tribes dictated treaty negotiations as the practical route.
The mode of dealing with Indians did not change after the American Revolution. The Constitution gave the new federal government
plenary power over Indian affairs. 49 It chose to deal with the In50
dian tribes through treaties far more often than by conquest. Most
treaties were written as between sovereigns, although a few treaties
contained language compatible with a view of the Indian tribe as a
protectorate. 5 1 At nearly the same time, Congress began to enact protective legislation. 52 A general pattern emerged, recognizing Indian tribal
sovereignty on the frontier but, in the proximity of more settled areas,
53
regarding the tribe as a ward in need of federal protection.
48. The decision to acquire land from Indian tribes by treaty as opposed to conquest presupposed that both parties to the treaty were sovereign powers. COHEN,
supra note 20, at 47. The concept of sovereignty is also inherent in the reservation
system which began in the colonial era. Under this system the Indian tribe traded
certain areas of land for the retention of dominion over others. For a description of
the origin of the reservation system in Massachusetts see Kawashima, Legal Origins
of the Indian Reservations in Colonial Massachusetts, supra note 21. See generally
W. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND, WHITE MAN'S LAW (1971).
49. See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
50. Felix Cohen summarized the attitude of the period by observing: "From the
first days of the organization of the Continental Congress great solicitude for the natives was evidenced. The Congress pledged itself to unusual exertions in securing and
preserving the friendship of the Indian nations." COHEN, supra note 20, at 47. See also
Mickenberg, supra note 21. and Mundt, Indian Autonomy and Indian Legal Problems, 15 KAN. L. REV. 505 (1967), in which the author stated: "Indian tribes were
recognized and dealt with as 'distinct, independent, political communities' qualified to
exercise the powers of self government from the earliest years of this country's existence." Id. quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 558 (1832).
51. COHEN, supra note 20, at 48. The preamble to the Treaty of Oct. 22. 1784.
7 Stat. 15 (1848), which states that the United States receives the Indians "into their
protection," is often regarded as the source of the wardship concept.
52. An early example of protective legislation was the first congressional enactment regulating trade and commerce with the Indians which invalidated sales of land
by Indian tribes unless accomplished by treaty. I Stat. 137, § 4 (1790). Another example was the employment of teachers for Indian tribes. 3 Stat. 516 (1819). The
creation of an office for a commissioner of Indian Affairs, 4 Stat. 564 (1832), and a
Department of Indian Affairs, 4 Stat. 735 (1834), also illustrate Congress' prevailing
philosophy towards Indians. For a detailed discussion of statutory enactments see
COHEN, supra note 20, at 11. See also Oliver, supra note 21; Bean, The Limits of
Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Cornucopia of Inherent Powers, 49 N.D.L. REV 303
(1973); Kelly, Indian Adjustment and the History of Indian Affairs, 10 ARIz. L. REV.
559 (1968); Mundt, Indian Autonomy and Indian Legal Problems, supra note 50.
53. See Oliver, supra note 21. One commentator described this phenomenon
from a sociological perspective:
The attitude of America toward the Indian has long been characterized by the
dichotomy between a sentimental attraction to the 'noble savage,' often increasing
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Judicial philosophy in the early period of United States-Indian relations laid the groundwork for divergent views of Indian tribal status.
Two opinions by Chief Justice Marshall clearly recognized the negotiation of Indian treaties as being based on mutual sovereignty: Cherokee Nation v. Georgia54 and Worcester v. Georgia.55 However, these
opinions also served to ground an argument for wardship.
In Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the Indian tribes are distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries within which their authority is exclusive. He also described the
status of the Indian tribes as that of distinct, independent communities
subject only to the regulation of federal laws in their interaction with
the states. 56 Thus, Worcester is a clear statement of tribal sovereignty.
One year earlier, Chief Justice Marshall wrote the opinion of the
Court in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. In this case, he also spoke of
57
the legal status of Indian tribes and their treaties:
The numerous treaties made with them by the United States, recognize
them as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and
war, of being responsible in their political character for any violation
. . . . The acts of our government plainly recognize the Cherokee
Nation as a State, and the courts are bound by those acts.
It is significant that it is in this context of federal-tribal interaction
that Marshall described Indian tribes as "domestic, dependent
58
nations.
Chief Justice Marshall further wrote that the Indian tribe's
relationship to the United States "resembles that of a ward to his
60
guardian."5 9 He explained:
with distance from the centers of Indian population, and a startling ignorance of
and indifference to the actual circumstances of his life.
Comment, The Indian: The Forgotten American, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1818 (1968).
54. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). This case involved the question whether the Cherokees could invoke original jurisdiction to enjoin execution of certain Georgia laws in
the Supreme Court. Jurisdiction was denied because the Cherokee nation did not
constitute a state or foreign nation.
55.

31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). This case involved Georgia's prosecution of a

white minister for failure to comply with a statute requiring a license and oath of
'allegiance from whites residing on reservation. The Court struck down the Georgia
statute as conflicting with a valid treaty.
56. Id. at 557.
57.

30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.

58.

Id. at 17-18.

59.
60.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness
and its power, appeal to it for relief to their wants . . . .They and
their country are considered by foreign nations, as well as by
ourselves, as being so completely under the sovereignty and dominion
of the United States, that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form
a political connection with them, would be considered by all as an
invasion of our territory and an act of hostility.
The Chief Justice did not apply the wardship label to individuals, but
rather to tribes. Furthermore, he did not say that Indian tribes were
wards, but that the relationship resembles that of a ward to his

guardian. For Marshall, the description was meant not to govern the
relationship of tribe to state, but merely to distinguish an Indian tribe
from a foreign nation on a geopolitical level. 61 The unfortunate result
of the wardship description has been the subsequent injudicious use of
the concept by other courts. It has been applied not to distinguish an

Indian tribe from a foreign nation, but as a governing concept of stateIndian relationships in treaty interpretation, ultimately successfully
competing for judicial attention with the doctrine of Indian tribal

sovereignty.

62

The stage had been set. Congress assumed the role of legislative
protagonist of the wardship doctrine. 63 At the same time, the judiciary
misspoke the script of the Marshall opinions. Two lines of cases
developed: on-reservation activities of Indian tribes continued to be
served by the language of sovereignty, 64 while off reservation, the
COHEN, supra note 20, at 170.
62. The balancing of these concepts resulted in what one author labeled "the
sovereign wards." Comment, The Indian: The Forgotten American, supra note 53.
The result has also been described as "residual sovereignty." Comment. The Indian
Battle for Self-Determination, supra note 21; Schaub, Indian Industrial Development
and the Courts, supra note 2 1.
63. Congress continued its earlier trend. See note 52 sapra. Such legislation included the Major Crimes Act of 1885, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1153 (1970) (jurisdiction
of federal courts extended to Indians charged with serious crimes against other Indians
on reservation), and the General Allotment Act, Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat.
388 (attempt to westernize the Indians by breaking up and distributing tribal lands).
See also Oliver, supra note 21.
Congress ended the treaty making era in 1871 by tacking to an Indian appropriation act a rider which stated: "[N] o Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the
United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or
power with whom the United States may contract by treaty ....." 25 U.S.C. § 71
(1970). The effect was to state that legislation would be the mode of Indian relations. The Act expressly preserved the validity of previously negotiated treaties. Id.
64. See, e.g., Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1855) (Indian exercise
of control over descent and distribution); The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737
(1867) (Indians free from state taxation if living on reservations); The New York

61.
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states were given jurisdiction over the exercise of treaty rights. Since
Washington involved off-reservation fishing rights, the focus here will
be on the latter genre of cases.
B.

Development of the Modern Doctrine in the Context of OffReservation Rights

Off-reservation Indian activities were quickly subjected by courts to
state regulation without consideration of whether the activities were
reserved treaty rights.6 5 The absence of consideration of elements of
tribal sovereignty is exemplified by the Supreme Court's holding in
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan.66 Kake did not involve treaty interpretation. Rather, it dealt with a conflict between off-reservation
Indian fishermen and Alaskan game laws. The Court considered the
only question to be whether state law had been pre-empted by federal
legislation. A state sovereign interest in the conservation of wildlife

within its borders was identified. Relying on Williams v. Lee67 which
had, in effect, extended state jurisdiction over non-Indian activities on
reservation, Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, did not find
any act of Congress precluding state action.6 8 The effect of this
Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1867) (same); Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)
(Indian not a citizen of U.S. and not entitled to vote although residing off reservation); United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916) (construing the General Allotment
Act and holding that treaties are not abrogated by implication); Jones v. Meehan,
175 U.S. 1 (1899) (upholding tribal sovereignty over inheritance); United States v.
Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916) (upholding tribal control over domestic relations);
Standby v. Roberts, 59 F. 945 (8th Cir. 1894) (upholding tribal power to tax);
Buster & Jones v. Wright, 135 F. 945 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599
(1906) (same). See also Pioneer Packing Co. v. Winslow, 59 Wash. 655, 294 P. 557
(1930) and Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001
(D. Minn. 1971), prohibiting state regulation of on-reservation fishing rights.
65. The courts through the wardship perspective also extended state jurisdiction
to some on-reservation activities of non-Indians. The leading case is Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217 (1959). The Williams court formalized state intervention on reservation
land under the "infringement" test: "[A] bsent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." Id. at 220. Under this test,
only acts of non-Indians against non-Indians allow state jurisdiction. If an Indian is
involved on either side of a dispute, tribal jurisdiction or express jurisdiction of other
courts (specified by Congress) is exclusive. Thus, absent such infringement, state
regulation is permissible since the tribe is merely a federal ward and not an independent sovereign.
66. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
67. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). State jurisdiction was not allowed in Williams because
the Court found that it would have undermined the authority of the tribal courts,
thus infringing the Indians' right to self-government. See note 65 supra.
68. 369 U.S. at 75. The Court found that the Alaska Statehood Act recognized
sufficient police power in the state to regulate the taking of wildlife within its borders.
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conclusion was to require explicit congressional language to preempt
asserted state jurisdiction based upon state sovereign interest. The Indian tribe was viewed totally as a ward, subject to the state's jurisdiction. The Court did not consider to what extent tribal sovereignty
should have been used to balance Indian tribal rights against state jurisdiction. The Court rejected an argument of exclusive federal jurisdiction by relying on stare decisis: Williams and an earlier case,
Draper v. United States,69 were cited as authority for dual jurisdiction. 70 In addition, Justice Frankfurter referred to precedent in the
71
form of legislation allowing state regulation of Indian activities.
In 1973 in the companion cases, McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona7 2 and Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,7 3 the
Court announced a new test to resolve state-Indian jurisdictional
74
questions. In McClanahan, the Court wrote:
See also Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan. 369 U.S. 45 (1962) (federal regulatory power pursuant to statute preempts exercise of state conservation law regarding
conservation fishing).
69.
164 U.S. 240 (1896). In Draper, the Court upheld a Montana statute requiring that the on-reservation murder of a non-Indian by another non-Indian came
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state court.
70. The Court concluded: "Draper and Williams indicate that 'absolute federal
jurisdiction' is not invariably exclusive jurisdiction." 369 U.S. at 68.
71. 369 U.S. at 72-75. The Court did not analyze the Alaska Statehood Act in
terms of jurisdiction or Indian sovereignty, but merely perpetuated the lack of analysis
in the Williams holding. The language of the Act was viewed as a disclaimer of proprietary rights and the state viewed as retaining police power over the land on the
basis of its own sovereignty. Id. at 68-69. While the result may have been appropriate
in Kake which did not involve a treaty right, parallel analysis is inappropriate between
treaties and legislation.
72. 411 U.S. 164(1973).
73. 411 U.S. 145 (1973). McClanahan involved imposition of a state income tax
on activities which occurred on reservation. Mascalero Apache Tribe applied an
analytical structure identical to that used in McClanahan (an examination of federal
legislation and treaties to ascertain the existence of federal intent to preempt state
jurisdiction) to off-reservation activities. Mescalero Apache Tribe relied on Williams
and fishing rights cases to find a state interest in asserting jurisdiction to tax offreservation activities. As there was no explicitly identified treaty right, the case should
be read as analogous to Kake, which only involved the interpretation of federal legislation. Unfortunately, as in Williams and McClanahan, the Court did not distinguish
between treaty-protected rights and rights protected only by federal statute. See id. at
150-51. All were included in the category of off-reservation activities. As far as the
case went. a dual jurisdiction system does appear to be appropriate when dealing with
a federal statute in an area of inherent state sovereignty. However, this treatment
should not be extended to rights protected by treaty. For another state tax-Indian
activity case which failed to make this distinction, see Tonasket v. State, 84 Wn. 2d
164, 525 P.2d 744 (1974). See generally Note, State Taxation of Indians. 49 WASH.
L. REV. 197 (1973) and Comment, Indian Taxation: Underlying Policies and Present
Problems, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1261 (1971).
74. 411 U.S. at 172.
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[T] he trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal
preemption . . .

The modem cases thus tend to avoid reliance on

platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the limits of state power.
Outside the central core of on-reservation Indian activities, according
to McClanahan,75 it is the state sovereign interest which controls, not
Indian tribal sovereignty. State jurisdiction is presumed legitimate
unless it is shown that a federal intent to preempt the state's regulatory
power exists. McClanahan itself, and as applied to off-reservation activity in Mescalero Apache Tribe, established an analytical mode by
which congressional intent as expressed in legislation, including state
enabling acts and treaties, is examined. The examination is made
against the backdrop of Indian tribal sovereignty which is used to give
an historical perspective to congressional intent. Then, only if congressional intent to preempt the "plenary power of the States over residents
with their borders" 76 exists is state jurisdiction inappropriate.
McClanahan and Mescalero Apache Tribe do not squarely meet
the issue of Indian tribal sovereignty. Even in its use of the tribal sovereignty concept as an historical backdrop, the Court's perspective was
limited. The Court looked only to the "traditional view" of Indian
sovereignty, i.e., the view that has developed through the evolution of
jurisdiction based upon wardship and that allows state jurisdiction
over on- and off-reservation activities. In taking this approach, the
Court failed to consider the origins of the competing jurisdictional
claims. 77 In addition, the McClanahanCourt expanded the use of legislative precedent in the interpretation of treaty rights, an unwarranted
approach. 78 The Court analyzed treaty rights as though they were
merely other federal legislation.

75.

76.
77.
tween
which

Id.

Id. at 165.
Thus McClanahan and Kake both erred in their failure to distinguish bestate jurisdiction based upon federal enabling legislation and circumstances in
state jurisdiction is asserted over an unabrogated treaty right. See Johnson v.

Gearlds, 234 U.S. 422 (1914) (a state's police power must give way to an un-

abrogated Indian treaty).
78. Narrowly construed, the holding of Mascalaro Apache Tribe may be appropriate in its analysis of legislative precedent. To the extent that it is applied to treaty
rights, it is susceptible to the same criticism as McClanahan.See note 73 supra.
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The Evolution of State Regulation of Off-Reservation Indian
Treaty Fishing

In the area of off-reservation treaty fishing rights, the courts again
have asserted, without a great deal of analysis of the status of Indian
treaties, that states have jurisdiction to regulate these rights. 7 9 The first
important case affecting the construction of off-reservation treaty
fishing rights was Ward v. Race Horse.8 0 Although this case involved
hunting rather than fishing rights, it presented a basis from which
states have argued that they are entitled to regulate both off-reserva81
tion Indian treaty hunting and fishing activities.
Race Horse had sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court
after his arrest for killing elk in violation of Wyoming game laws. The
Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court's grant of the writ, held
that the treaty right, by its express language, was only temporary and
had expired upon Wyoming's entry into the Union. Therefore, the
Court held Race Horse subject to state game laws. 82 Two propositions
emerge from an examination of this case: (1) the Court did not construe the treaty language in favor of the Indians 83 and (2), the decision
is based upon the expiration of treaty rights rather than upon state
power to regulate off-reservation treaty hunting and fishing. Race
Horse is only dictum, therefore, to the extent it asserted a state power
84
to regulate off-reservation treaty-right activities.
Another important case is United States v. Winans.85 This case involved the right of access over lands owned by whites to the usual and
accustomed fishing sites of Yakima Indians. The Supreme Court held
that private, rather than public, ownership of the land did not terminate the reserved right of treaty fishing, and that the exercise of this
79. Several authors on Indian treaty fishing rights use this proposition as their
basic premise. See Johnson, supra note 33; Comment, Indian Fishing Rights, 8 WILLAMETTE L.J. 248 (1972); Note, Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights, 48 N.D.L. REV.
729 (1972); Note, Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights, 18 N.Y.L.F. 442 (1973),
reprinted in I AM. INDIAN L. REV. 79 (1973). See also Burnett, supra note 41, at 49;
Comment, State Power and the Indian Treaty Right to Fish, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 485
(1971). Cf. Comment. Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights, supra note 33.
80. 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
81. See discussion in Johnson, supra note 33, at 219-20.
82. 163 U.S. at 540.
83. This violated a basic canon of Indian treaty interpretation. See note 30 and
accompanying text supra.
84. Another commentator has reached the same conclusion. See Johnson. supra
note 33, at 220.
85.

198 U.S. 371 (1905).
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right entitled the Indians to an easement over the land to their usual
87
and accustomed fishing sites. 86 The Court gratuitously concluded:
[I] t was within the competency of the nation to secure to the Indians
such a remnant of the great rights they possessed . . . .Nor does it
restrain the State unreasonably, if at all, in the regulation of the right.
It only fixes in the land such easements as enable the right to be exercised.
In this statement, the Court recognized only in dictum a state right of
regulation over off-reservation Indian activities. The question of state
jurisdiction to regulate was not even before the Court.
The sovereign power of a state over fish and game within its borders was clearly recognized in Geer v. Connecticut.88 The Court in
Geer reasoned that wildlife is the common property of all citizens of a
state. To protect this resource on behalf of its citizenry the state can
assert sufficient police power to guarantee conservation. In New York
ex rel. Kennedy v. Baker,8 9 the state's sovereign power to regulate in
the interest of wildlife conservation was first coupled with the developing trend of judicial approval of state jurisdiction in areas formerly
under Indian tribal control.9 0 In that case three Senecas were convicted of spear fishing on lands ceded to the state. They claimed a reserved right to fish based upon a sale of land to a private party. The
contract of sale, ratified by Congress, did contain a clause guaranteeing a privilege to fish on ceded land.91 The Court agreed with
New York that the sovereignty of the state prevailed: 92 "It is not to be
doubted that the power to preserve fish and game within its borders is
86. Id. at 381. The Court noted that to hold otherwise would render the treaty
right meaningless and that its construction was probably that intended by the parties
at the time of negotiation. Id.
87. Id. at 384.
88. 161 U.S. 519 (1896). For a development of the sovereignty argument, see
Burnett, supra note 41, at 57-62. See also note 39 supra.
89. 241 U.S. 556(1916).
90. See, e.g., United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881); United States v.
Draper, 164 U.S. 240 (1896) (extending state jurisdiction to crimes by non-Indians
against non-Indians committed on reservation lands). See also People v. Pable, 23
Colo. 134, 43 P. 636 (1896) (extending state jurisdiction to offenses between Indians
committed off reservation). One author has argued that this expansion of state jurisdiction over crime and wildlife gave impetus to state control over off-reservation
fishing rights. See Burnett, supra note 41.
91. Contract between Robert Morris and the Seneka nation of Indians, Sept. 15,
1797, 7 Stat. 601 (1848). The agreement provided that the Indians reserved "the
privileges of fishing and hunting ...." Id. at 602.
92. 241 U.S. at 562 (citations omitted).
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inherent in the sovereignty of the state, subject, of course, to any valid
exercise of authority under the

.

.

.

federal Constitution." The Court

then considered the language of the agreement. Although recognizing
that "[i] t has frequently been said that treaties with the Indians
should be construed in the sense in which the Indians understood
94
them,"'93 the Court concluded with chilling finality:
But it is idle to suppose that there was any actual anticipation at the
time the treaty was made of the conditions now existing ....

[T] he

existence of the sovereignty of the state was well understood, and this
conception involved all that was necessarily implied in that sovereignty, whether fully appreciated or not.
The Winans dictum has been cited as firm authority for the proposition
that states have jurisdiction to regulate off-reservation treaty fishing
rights. 95 Kennedy was readily adopted by state courts 96 and stood as

the law of the land on fishing rights.
The next case involving off-reservation treaty fishing rights, Tulee
v. Washington,97 was decided in 1942. In Tulee, the Washington Supreme Court followed what had been to that time the trend in regulation of off-reservation Indian activities and held that the Yakimas,
although fishing under treaty right, had to purchase fishing licenses on
the same basis as non-Indians. 98 The United States Supreme Court
reversed. The treaty included the usual term reserving to the Indians
the right to fish in ceded areas at "usual and accustomed" sites. The
Court held that although nondiscriminatory on its face, the fee was
invalid as an illegal state tax imposing too heavy a burden on the exercise of the federal treaty right. 99 However, the Court added, again in
93. Id. at 563.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 564. Kennedy can be distinguished from Winans because the agreement
reserved a privilege to fish, not a right. When coupled with the fact that the state of
New York existed at the time of negotiation, the Court's view that state jurisdiction
was or should have been contemplated becomes reasonable. Absent the existence of
a state at the time of negotiation, courts have held that it is not reasonable to expect
the Indian signatories to foresee the interposition of an additional layer, a sovereign
layer, into the structure of the agreements. See Montana Power Co. v. Rochester, 127
F.2d 189, 192 (9th Cir. 1942); State v. Tinno, 94 Idaho 759, 497 P.2d 1386 (1969).
96. See, e.g., People v. Chosa, 252 Mich. 154, 233 N.W. 205 (1930); State v.
Meninock, 115 Wash. 528, 197 P. 641 (1921).
97. 315U.S. 681(1942).
98. 7 Wn. 2d 124, 109 P.2d 280 (1941).
99. 315 U.S. at 684-85.
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dictum: "[T] he treaty leaves the state with power to impose on Indians, equally with others, such restrictions of a purely regulatory nature concerning the time and manner of fishing outside the reservation
as are necessary for the conservation of fish .... ,u00 Tulee concluded
by balancing the state's jurisdictional power with the Indians' reserved
treaty right. The Court held that state regulation was permissible only
where "necessary for the conservation of fish."'10 This limitation was
recognized because the state's jurisdictional power was asserted to rest
upon its inherent power under Geer to regulate wildlife within its borders. Thus, the treaty right to fish could be regulated only when it
confficted with the sovereign state power over conservation.
The Tulee Court's reasoning is unpersuasive for two reasons. First,
it assumed from prior decisions that the state had the power, on the
basis of its own sovereignty, to regulate off-reservation Indian activities, even when protected by treaty. As has been demonstrated, however, the Court has never explored this issue in searching analysis.
Second, the Court once again failed to analyze the nature of the treaty
right and asserted that regulation was proper where "necessary" even
though the case did not factually present the question.1 02 Sovereign
negotiation of treaties and the reservation of rights were issues left
untreated.
In Makah Indian Tribe v. Schoettler, 03 the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit first faced the issue of when a regulation is "necessary for conservation." It held that Washington State could not prohibit net fishing by Indians under treaty right without proof that such
regulation was necessary to preserve the salmon run on the stream
involved where the effect of the prohibition would have been to eliminate the Indian harvest. Thus, the court rejected a construction of
"necessary" as being merely appropriate. 10 4 The court further indicated that the state could regulate the Indian harvest only when it had
shown the need to limit it in the interest of conservation and had
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 684.
Id.
One author has argued that such "necessary" regulations are beneficial to

Indians and therefore permissible under the treaties. See Comment, State Power and
the Indian Treaty Right to Fish, supra note 79. The better argument is to the con-

trary and focuses upon the statement as dictum. See Johnson, supra note 33; Burnett,
supra note 41. The latter author argues that the decision was a compromise of competing sovereign interests in the Indians' favor.
103.
104.

192F.2d224(9thCir. 1951).
Id. at 226.
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proven the regulation necessary to the success of the proposed limita105
tion.
The first case examining off-reservation treaty rights in a treatyoriented context was State v. Arthur.10 6 The Idaho Supreme Court
held, consistent with the principles of treaty construction, 10 7 that
under the supremacy clause off-reservation treaty hunting rights could
not be abrogated except by consent of the Indians or by positive act of
the federal government extinguishing their rights. 10 8 The court held
that a reading of the treaty right, in the sense understood by the Indians at the time of negotiation, would not support state jurisdiction to
impose hunting season restrictions on the exercise of that right.' 0 9
Four years later, the reasoning of the Idaho court was nearly
adopted by Washington in State v. Satiacum.110 Four members of the
Washington Supreme Court held, similarly to Arthur, that the state
could not impose seasons, in this case on netted steelhead, because of
the existence of an unabandoned and unabrogated treaty right.11 '
Four other justices, while agreeing that the conviction for fishing out
of season should not stand, followed the Tulee precedent and held
that charges should be dismissed solely because the state had failed to
12
demonstrate that its regulation was necessary for conservation.'
In the next important decision, Maison v. Confederated Tribes of
Umatilla Indian Reservation,113 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit considered an action for an injunction and a declaratory judgment concerning the effect of Oregon regulatory laws on treaty fishing
rights. In affirming the trial court's issuance of an injunction against
4
the enforcement of the state laws, the court wrote:"
[I] n both the Tulee and Makah cases it was held that the Indians'
right to fish is qualified by the state's right to regulate such fishing
when necessary for conservation. But, to establish necessity the state
must prove two facts: first, that there is a need to limit the taking of
105. Id. This is a narrow reading of Tdee, but one which is consistent with the
view that the state's jurisdictional power originates only in its sovereign power over
conservation of wildlife.
106. 74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135 (1 9 53). cert. denied, 347 U.S. 937 (1954).
107. See notes 19-25 and accompanying text supra.
108. 261 P.2d at 142.
109. Id. at 143.
110. 50 Wn. 2d 513.314 P.2d 400 (1957).
111. Id. at529.314P.2dat410.
112. Id. at 535. 314 P.2d at 412 (Rosellini. J.. concurring in the result).
113. 314 F.2d 169 (9th Cir.). cert. denied, 357 U.S. 829(1963).
114. ld. at 172.
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fish, second, that the particular regulation sought to be imposed is "indispensable" to the accomplishment of the needed limitation.
The Maison court ignored treaty interpretation analysis and simply
construed "indispensable" to mean that regulation of the Indian treaty
right was to be employed only as a last resort.
The Washington Supreme Court had a second opportunity to
consider treaty net fishing off reservation and out of season in State v.
McCoy.115 The McCoy court reversed the trial court decision which
had applied Arthur" 6 and, in language very similar to Kake," 7 held
that the inherent sovereign power of the state allowed it to regulate
fish and game absent a "clear and unequivocal expression of
Congressional will by Congress."' "18 As the dissenting opinion noted,
however, Kake did not involve a treaty right and therefore was
inapplicable to the case before the court. 1 9 Once again, state power
to regulate had been asserted without a proper examination of the
treaty involved. The result was a holding that the state possessed
power to regulate the harvest of fish and game reserved by treaty,
subject only to a limitation that the regulation be "reasonable and
necessary" for conservation.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the general principle of
permissible state jurisdiction in Puyallup Tribe v. Department of
Game of Washington12 0 (Puyallup 1). The Washington State
Department of Game had sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against the Puyallup and Nisqually Indians for fishing off reservation
for salmon and steelhead with nets in violation of state regulations. In
upholding the granting of such relief, the Court by implication
rejected the Maison indispensability test and stated: 21'
The treaty right is in terms of the right to fish "at all usual and
accustomed places.". . . But the manner in which the fishing may be
done . . . [is] not mentioned in the Treaty. . . . Certainly the right

of [non-Indians] may be regulated. And we see no reason why the
right of the Indians may not also be regulated by an appropriate
115.
116.

117.
118.

63 Wn. 2d 421,387 P.2d 942 (1963).
See notes 106-09 and accompanying text supra.

See notes 66-70 and accompanying text supra.

63 Wn. 2d at 437, 387 P.2d at 952. Also discussed was the equal footing doc-

trine. See note 39 supra.
119. Id. at 443,387 P.2d at 955 (Donworth, J., dissenting).
120.

391 U.S. 392 (1968).

121.

Id. at 398 (emphasis in original).
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exercise of the police power of the State. .

.

. [T] he manner of

fishing, the size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing, and
the like may be regulated by the State in the interest of conservation,
provided the regulation meets appropriate standards and does not
discriminate against the Indians.
So accepted by this time was the notion that a state could regulate the
off-reservation treaty activities of Indians that no citation was given
by the Court when it acknowledged the state's power. The only
apparent limitations on the state were that it not discriminate against
the Indians and that it exercise its police power only in the interests of
conservation by means of regulations meeting appropriate
standards. 122 The Court did not define what constituted appropriate
standards.
Three shortcomings are evident in the Court's approach to
Puyallup I. First, the Court did not undertake to read the treaty in
light of the probable understanding of the tribes at the time of
negotiations. The Court stated that since "the manner" of fishing was
not provided in the treaty, it could be regulated by the state. It must
be remembered that the treaties were negotiated predominantly in
the Chinook jargon-300 words strong.123 Complex dialogue was
impossible. When the fishing rights were reserved, Indian tribes could
not have foreseen that the government would eventually be allowed
to impose time restrictions on their fishing or that the use of nets
would be prohibited. Second, the argument that a treaty right cannot
be qualified by a state, but its exercise may be qualified, is sophistry.
Such as argument provides a right in form only, not in practice. This
interpretation surely cannot be the construction of the original parties,
Indian or non-Indian. Finally, the decision failed to come to grips
with the core issue: the treaty right exists as a right reserved between
mutual sovereigns. Instead of examining the controversy in terms of
treaty analysis, the Court revealed its obvious preconception that
states have jurisdiction to regulate off-reservation Indian activities.
Although the Puyallup I approach has endured, its holding is no
longer viable. In 1969, an Oregon federal district court decided
Sohappy v. Smith, 12 4 an action brought by the United States against
122. Id. at 399.
123. See note 11 supra. It should also be noted that the treaties were written in
English which few Indians could read. See United States v. Washington. 384 F. Supp.
312. 355-56 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
124. 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Ore. 1969).
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the State of Oregon on behalf of several Indian tribes to enjoin, as a
denial of Indian treaty rights, enforcement of that state's fishing
regulations. The court construed the Puyallup I decision as requiring
more than mere nondiscrimination in the application of state police
power.' 2 5 Focusing upon the effect of the regulations, Judge Belloni
indicated that the only jurisdictional basis upon which the state can
regulate the Indian right is conservation. 126 The state was denied
plenary power to regulate the Indian fishery. In recognizing the
competing sovereign interests of the tribe and the state, the court
127
observed:
Oregon recognizes sports fishermen and commercial fishermen and
seems to attempt to make an equitable division between the two. But
the state seems to have ignored the rights of the Indians .

. .

. If

Oregon intends to maintain a separate status of commercial and sports
fisheries, it is obvious a third must be added, the Indian fishery.
Thus, the Court compelled the state to recognize and accommodate
the Indian fishery in its regulatory scheme. In addition, it emphasized
that the Indian fishery could not be regulated for the benefit of the
other fisheries. As a result, the court placed severe restrictions on what
at first glance appeared to be a broad authorization from Puyallup I
28
for state regulation.
In 1973, Puyallup I, having been remanded because of the breadth
of the original state injunction against Indian net fishing, again came
125. The state argued that regulation was permissible if Indians and non-Indians
merqly were treated identiczlly. Id. at 907.
126. Id. at 908.
127. Id. at 910-.11. The Court in this case felt that the result simply would be
"that some of the fish now taken by sportsmen and commercial fishermen must be
shared with the treaty Indians, as our forefathers promised over a hundred years ago."
Id. at 911.
128. Shortly thereafter, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the state's power
under the authority of Puyallup I to prohibit treaty net fishing for steelhead as a valid
regulation reasonably necessary for conservation in State v. Moses, 79 Wn. 2d 104,
483 P.2d 832 (1971). The court relied on the concept of inherent state sovereign
control and ownership of wildlife within its borders; it made no attempt to analyze
the treaty language. Further development occurred in People v. Jondreau, 384 Mich.
539, 185 N.W.2d 375 (1971), which, after the Puyallup I decision, overruled an appellate court's affirmation of a conviction for illegal possession of trout by an Indian
fishing off reservation under a treaty right. The court rejected a rule that would have
subjected Indians to the same regulation as non-Indians, and followed State v. Arthur,
74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 937 (1954). See text
accompanying notes 106-09 supra. See also Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391
U.S. 404 (1968), in which the Court held, based upon aboriginal title rather than
treaty, terminated reservation lands were subject to the exercise of fishing and hunting
rights because repeal of such rights by implication is unfavored.
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before the Court. 12 9 The Washington Supreme Court had upheld the

Department of Game's regulations as reasonable and necessary for the
conservation of the fish resource. 130 Perpetuating the language of
Puyallup I which allowed state regulation of the time and manner of

off-reservation treaty fishing, the United States Supreme Court in
Puyallup H explored the effects of the regulations. In holding that the
state could not regulate so as to discriminate against the Indian
31
fishery, the Court wrote:1

The aim is to accommodate the rights of Indians under the Treaty
and the rights of other people.
We do not imply that these fishing rights persist down to the very
last steelhead in the river. Rights can be controlled by the need to
conserve the species . . . . [T] he Treaty does not give the Indians a
federal right to pursue the last living steelhead until it enters their
nets.
Thus, the Court seemed to modify Puyallup I by accepting the

Sohappy analysis of accommodation. But the Court once again
avoided a direct examination of treaty rights in the context of Indian
tribal sovereignty. The jurisdictional power of the state was merely
reasserted. The only limitation on the state was that it could regulate,
not in terms of plenary power, but in terms of consevvation, after the
rights of the Indian fishery had been accommodated. 132 The
importance of this limitation became apparent in the Washington
decision.
Thus, analysis of the extent of treaty rights was never undertaken

by the Court. 133 Obeisance

to stare decisis replaced

critical

examination. The error has been judicial reliance upon precedent
129. Department of Game of Washington v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973).
130. 80 Wn. 2d 561, 497 P.2d 171 (1972).
131. 414 U.S. at 49. The Court found that the Washington regulations discriminated against Indians because they proscribed all Indian net fishing in derogation of
treaty rights. Id.
132. Cf. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
133. Recently, the Court reaffirmed its position and again failed to consider adequately the treaty rights involved. In Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975).
an Indian was charged with a violation of state law for hunting out of season on
ceded land. The agreement ceding the former reservation land contained a clause reserving the right to fish and hunt. The Court held that while the agreement was part
of the supreme law of the land, the state may regulate the treaty right if the regulation meets appropriate standards and does not discriminate against Indians as required
by Puyallup I and II. Id. at 207. The Court concluded: "The 'appropriate standards'
requirement means that the State must demonstrate that its regulation is a reasonable
and necessary conservation measure . . . and that its application to the Indians is
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which is no more than dictum and which is founded upon mistaken
principles. As a result of this development, there is a core of onreservation tribal activities controlled by federal law which a state
may not infringe. Outside this area, a state may assert its jurisdictional
claim if an appropriate basis derived from its sovereign power exists,
e.g., conservation of wildlife.' 3 4 If there is such a basis, explicit
federal intent to pre-empt must be found before state jurisdiction will
be declared inappropriate. The outcome of this judicial treatment is
that the origin of the Indian tribal right in an unabrogated treaty has
been subordinated. This was the status of the law Judge Boldt was
asked to apply to the treaty rights before him.
IV.
A.

UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON
Analysis and Evaluation

An analysis of the Washington decision must begin with an outline
of the framework in which a remedy was fashioned. Judge Boldt
began with the fundamental premise that "[t] he treaty was not a
grant of rights to the treating Indians, but a grant of rights from them,
and a reservation of those not granted."' 35 For Judge Boldt, both the
historical context of reservation of the right to fish and the recognition
13 6
of mutual sovereignty in the negotiation process were important.
37
He wrote:1
The taking of anadromous fish from usual and accustomed places,
the right to which was secured to the Treaty Tribes in the Stevens'
treaties, constituted both the means of economic livelihood and the
foundation of native culture. .

.

. [T] he mere passage of time has

not eroded, and cannot erode, the rights guaranteed by solemn treaties
that both sides pledged on their honor to uphold.
necessary in the interest of conservation." Id. (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted).
Because the state had failed to demonstrate the requisite need for regulation, the
Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case to the state court.
134. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975), indicated a weakening of the
state sovereign interest concept. The Court indicated that the important question was
whether there was a federal right to be protected by the supremacy clause, not
whether state sovereignty was to be observed. 420 U.S. at 205. However, the Court
confirmed the permissible state regulation of Puyallup 1. See note 133 supra.
135. 384 F. Supp. at 407.
136. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit accepted this recognition of
treaties as instruments settling rights among sovereigns. United States v. Washington,
520 F.2d 676, 684-85 (9th Cir. 1975).
137. 384F. Supp. at 406-07.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 51: 61, 1975

Given the reserved treaty right, the principles of treaty interpretation
38
were stated in the following terms:'
It is the responsibility of all citizens to see that the terms of the Stevens' treaties are carried out, so far as possible, in accordance with the
meaning they were understood to have by the tribal representatives at
the councils, and in a spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation of this nation to protect the interests of a dependent people.
Thus, the court recognized the paramount importance of the treaty
right in seeking a solution to the controversy before it.
Judge Boldt directly confronted the issue whether the state possesses the requisite power to regulate off-reservation fishing rights
granted by treaty. Recognizing the import of the Indian contention
that no power exists, he carefully traced the history of state regulation
and concluded that the power to regulate is mistakenly based upon
1 39
He added that:'
dictum and inadequate analysis.

40

[I] t is unfortunate, to say the least, that state police power regulation
of off reservation fishing should be authorized or invoked on a legal
basis never specifically stated or explained. This is particularly true
because state regulation of off reservation treaty right fishing is highly
obnoxious to the Indians and in practical application adds greatly to
already complicated and difficult problems and may stimulate continuing controversy and litigation long into the future.
Despite this realization, Judge Boldt felt constrained to follow the
41
mandate of the Supreme Court in the Puyallup decisions.'
Having reached these threshold conclusions, the court pointed out
that the exercise of the tribal treaty right off reservation is limited
138. Id. at 406. The court concluded that the admission of Washington into the
United States had no effect upon the treaty rights involved in the controversy. Rather.
"[s] uch admission imposed upon the State, equally with other states, the obligation to
observe and carry out the provisions of treaties of the United States." Id. at 401.
139. Id.at334-39.
140. Id. at 338-39.
141. See notes 120-23 and 129-32 and accompanying text supra. In recognizing
the state's authority to regulate off-reservation fishing, Judge Boldt stated:
[J] udicial integrity also requires this court to hold that the tribes' contention that
the state does not have legal authority to regulate the exercise of their off reservation treaty right fishing must be and hereby is denied by this court. The basis
of this ruling is the indisputable and unqualified duty of every federal circuit or
trial judge, despite academic or personal misgivings, to enforce and apply every
principle of law as it is directly stated in a decision of the United States Supreme
Court.
384 F. Supp. at 339.
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only by the geographical phrase "usual and accustomed" places, the
numerical limit imposed by the "in common with" phrase, and conservation purposes.' 42 It is not limited to specific manners or methods of
taking fish. 14 3 Therefore, the state's police power to regulate off-reservation fishing activities exists only as required for resource preservation and protection of all those entitled to share in the harvest. 144 To
validly regulate off-reservation Indian fishing rights, a regulation must
not discriminate against the treaty tribe's reserved right to fish, must
be appropriate from a substantive and procedural due process standpoint and must be both reasonable and necessary to preserve and
maintain the resource. 4 5 The state bears the burden of demonstrating
46
necessity.'
On the basis of these principles the court fashioned a remedy. Operating from an historical perspective, the court first identified certain
exclusions from regulation either under the treaty or by the state pursuant to its police power. It found that the taking of fish for consumption and religious purposes had special importance in context of the
treaty negotiations, independent from fishing for commercial purposes. Because of this importance, these uses were excluded from regulation by the state. 147 The court also recognized that on-reservation
fishing is an exclusive right based upon the language of the treaty.148
The court then sought to accommodate the state's power over wildlife, as necessary for conservation, with the Indian treaty right to fish
off reservation. Judge Boldt considered the limitations upon both sovereign powers. He concluded that for a regulation to be necessary for
1

142. In Conclusion of Law No. 25, 384 F. Supp. at 402, the court held:
The exercise of a treaty tribe's right to take anadromous fish is limited only by
the geographical extent of the usual and accustomed fishing places, the limits of

the harvestable stock, the tribe's fair need for fish, and the opportunity for nonIndians to fish in common with Indians outside reservation boundaries.
143.

Id. at 401. But see Puyallup 11, 414 U.S. 44 (1973).

144.

Id. at 401-02.

145.

Id. at 402. The Supreme Court recognized this principle in Antoine v. Wash-

ington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975). See note 133 supra.
146. Id. The court noted that the Depaitment of Game especially had failed to
take into account Indian fishing. Id. at 395.
147. Id. at 343. This conclusion was upheld on appeal. 520 F.2d at 690.
148.

Id. In affirming this conclusion, Judge Choy, writing for the Ninth Circuit,

stated:
The right to take fish in common with the settlers off the reservation was a
right reserved by the Indians in addition to their right to occupy and use reservation land. The settlers obtained no analogous rights on the reservations. Other
citizens clearly have no more claim to a share of fish caught on the reservations
than they do to a right to reside on those reservations.

520 F.2d at 690.
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conservation, its purpose must be to provide an adequate number of
escapement fish to spawn and propogate the next run of salmon. 149
Because numerous state regulations and statutes did not meet this test
or because they were discriminatory in their effects, Judge Boldt held
that they could not lawfully be applied to restrict Indian treaty fishing
rights 5 0 and he enjoined their application.151
In examining the treaty-imposed restrictions on fishing rights,
Judge Boldt attempted to apply treaty analysis to reach an accommodation of the competing interests. He examined the terms "usual and
accustomed" and "in common with" as they had been defined in the
mid-nineteenth century and as they would have been understood by
the treaty tribes. 152 In this context, the language "usual and accustomed places" emerged as the source of the off-reservation Indian
fishing right and as a limitation on it. That language, as Judge Boldt
viewed it, had recognized that the tribes in western Washington travelled to a series of sites to fish for spring, summer and autumn runs,
and returned to their villages during the winter.' 5 3 It had limited the
exercise of that right to those areas alone. Judge Boldt sought to delineate the "usual and accustomed" fishing sites in specific geographical
54
terms for each tribe before the court.1
The language "in common with" posed another limitation. The
court rejected the argument that Indians had a right to fish only in the
149. The court labeled this concept as "adequate production escapement." 384
F. Supp. at 402.
150. Id. at 403-04.
151. Id. at 415. These statutes are codified in the following sections of the WASH.
REV. CODE (1974): § 75.08.260 (penalty for violation of fisheries code); § 75.12.060
(prohibition against catching salmon with fixed appliances); § 75.12.070 (prohibition
against shooting, gaffing, etc. food or shellfish); § 75.12.160 (prohibition against salmon
fishing with reef nets outside designated waters); § 77.08.020 (definition of "game
fish"); § 77.12.100 (seizure of contraband game and devices); § 77.12.130 (declaration of certain devices as public nuisances): § 77.16.020 (prohibition against hunting.
trapping or fishing in the closed season or on game reserves, and prohibition against
exceeding bag limits): § 77.16.030 (prohibition against processing fish. birds or game
in closed season, or in excess of bag limit); § 77.16.040 (prohibition against trafficking in game); § 77.16.060 (prohibition of explosives, medicated bait, etc. in fishing).
The affected regulations codified in WASH. AD. CODE (1974) are: § 220-20-010 (general provisions regarding lawful and unlawful taking of fish for food): § 220-20-015(2)
(prohibition against commercial fishing within 3 miles of any river emptying into
Puget Sound); § 220-47-020 (salmon preserve areas).
152. 384 F. Supp. at 356.
153. See text accompanying note 10 supra. Judge Boldt concluded that usual and
accustomed fishing places could be designated only in terms of freshwater systems and
marine areas. Thus, watercourse changes would not impair the scope of the treaty
rights. 384 F. Supp. at 402.
154. 384 F. Supp. at 359-82.
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same manner and to the same extent as non-Indians. 15 5 The court
concluded that the clause was merely a recognition, in terms of the
probable meaning attached to it at the time of the negotiations, that
the ability to fish at the off-reservation locations was not exclusively
the Indians' and that non-Indians could fish at the same sites. 156 The
source and extent of each right was different, however. The right of
non-Indians was properly viewed as a privilege granted by the sovereign
state, whereas the right of the Indians was a reserved treaty right.
Because of a long history of conflict over the extent of fishing
rights, Judge Boldt felt that a concrete accommodation of the rights of
each fishery at the usual and accustomed places was necessary. In
attempting to reach a numerical accommodation, he considered the
most probable meaning of the language to the parties at the time,
supported by contemporary dictionary definitions of "in common
157
with." He concluded:
By dictionary definition and as intended and used in the Indian
treaties and in this decision "in common with" means sharing equally
the opportunity to take fish at "usual and accustomed grounds and
stations"; therefore, non-treaty fishermen shall have the opportunity to
take up to 50% of the harvestable number of fish that may be taken
by all fishermen at usual and accustomed grounds and stations and
treaty right fishermen shall have the opportunity to take up to the
same percentage of harvestable fish ....
Judge Boldt pointed out that a significant portion of each run is
harvested in marine areas closely adjacent to and within waters of the
State of Washington before it reaches the usual and accustomed
Indian fishing sites. Thus, to provide an equal opportunity for all
155. Id. at 356-57. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld this conclusion. 520 F.2d at 688.
156. Id. at 357.
157.

Id. at 343 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted). The court found that the

phrase probably had been introduced into the treaties by an advisor of Governor
Stevens. It apparently did not exist in Chinook jargon, and the minutes of the treaty
negotiations do not reflect any discussion of the clause. Id. at 356. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit employed a co-tenancy analogy in upholding the 50-50
split, pointing to the discretion of a court in equity to apportion rights to protect the
interests of all parties. 520 F.2d at 685. The appellate court cited Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973) (district court has equity power to order reimbursement of schools for services performed pursuant to invalidated statute), and
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (district court has
equity power to fashion remedies to eliminate school segregation), in support of this
proposition.
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parties to share in the resource, not only must fish passing through the
usual and accustomed places be counted, but adjustments must be
made for those which were harvested before reaching such grounds.15 8
As a result of the Washington decision, the Indian tribes can claim
a reserved treaty right, without any state regulation, to as many fish as
can be caught on reservation. 159 In addition, there is a reserved treaty
right to take as many anadromous fish as are needed for religious and
consumption purposes. Finally, the Indians are entitled to an
opportunity to harvest 50 percent of all anadromous fish passing
through usual and accustomed off-reservation sites, plus a favorable
adjustment for fish caught adjacent to but beyond the state's territorial
1 60
waters.
Another important aspect of the Washington decision is the
requirement that the state recognize the Indian fishery in the
formulation of its policies. 16 1 To implement this holding, Judge Boldt
required the state and Indian tribes to cooperate in the development
158. 384 F. Supp. at 344. Judge Boldt labeled this an "equitable adjustment"
which was intended to "compensate treaty tribes for the substantially disproportionate
numbers of fish, many of which might otherwise be available to treaty right fishermen
for harvest, caught by non-treaty fishermen ...." Id. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit limited this adjustment to the catches of Washington citizens, thus placing
the loss suffered to foreign fishing harvests on both Indians and non-Indians. 520
F.2d at 693.
159. Separate from the principle that in treaty negotiations the tribes reserve rights
to themselves, is the "reserved rights doctrine." Under this doctrine, the federal government, in creating a reservation on federal land, either expressly or impliedly reserves sufficient resources on that property to satisfy present and future needs. This
doctrine has had its widest application in water rights cases. See, e.g., Winters v.
United States. 207 U.S. 564 (1908); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
The doctrine was applied in Washington to identify and serve as a basis to quantify
the treaty right involved. 384 F. Supp. at 343.
160. An issue of vital importance to the Washington decision was the effect of
the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission in regulating the harvest of
salmon between United States and Canadian fishermen. The Commission is empowered
by compact. Sockeye Salmon Fisheries Agreement with Canada, May 26, 1930, 50
Stat. 1355 (1937), T.S. No. 918. The tribes contended that while they were bound
by the Constitution, and therefore by the compact as a subsequent treaty, it was the
duty of the state to harmonize the compact and the treaties and to recognize the
tribal fishing rights to the fullest extent possible. Brief for Appellees at 50-57. United
States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975). The state contended
that it could not fulfill its obligation under the compact if it had to prove that
regulation of the Indian fishery was necessary for conservation. Brief for Appellants,
Dept. of Fisheries, id. at 21-26. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the
argument that the compact pre-empted Indian treaty rights. Following Menominee
Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968), the court pointed out that
Indian treaty rights are not abrogated absent explicit statutory language and indicated
that it was the duty of the state to adjust the rights of non-Indian citizens to comply
with the Indian treaties and the compact. 520 F.2d at 689-90.
161. 384 F. Supp. at 403.
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of general guidelines and principles of tribal fishing regulation and to
162
pool information regarding the runs.
Because the state can regulate only when reasonable and necessary
for conservation, an important concept in Judge Boldt's remedy is
tribal self-regulation. Judge Boldt found a clear congressional intent
and philosophy to increase tribal self-government. 163 To be selfregulatory, and as the term implies, completely free of state regulation
'in the exercise of its treaty fishing rights, a tribe must have certain
qualifications and comply with certain conditions. 164 The basic
qualifications are a well-organized and efficient internal structure and
an ability in fish sciences and management to provide for conservation
of the runs. These conditions require cooperation with the state in
management of the harvest. Under Washington, once a tribe can
demonstrate its ability to provide for conservation of the runs, the
only legitimate purpose for state regulation ceases to exist and the
tribe can become self-regulatory in the exercise of its treaty fishing
rights, subject to the enumerated conditions. 165 Even if not qualifying
as self-regulatory, the court required each plaintiff tribe to certify its
members, to provide identification cards for them and to provide fish
1 66
catch reports for all tribal fishing.
A major area of concern untreated in this comment is the myriad
administrative problems created by the Washington decision.
Undoubtedly there will be substantial changes in the operations of the
state agencies concerned. The major problems are logistical.
162. Id. at 341.
163. Id. at 340. Judge Boldt specifically mentioned the "Indian Civil Rights Act,"
Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201-701, 82 Stat. 77-81 (codified in

scattered sections of 18, 25 U.S.C.), as a manifestation of congressional concern
for tribal autonomy. Id.
164.

Id. at 340-41. This was one of the most hotly contested issues on appeal.

The state argued that this portion of the decision overstepped the bounds of Puyallup
11 and that not only could the state agencies not function under such a system, but

that it would also be disastrous for the salmon runs as well. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, however, upheld this portion of the decision stating: "So long
as the tribes responsibly insure that the run of each species in each stream is preserved, the legitimate conservation interests of the state are not infringed." 520
F.2d at 686.
165. The court enumerated three conditions which the tribe must accept and abide
by to the satisfaction of either the Department of Fisheries or the Department of
Game in order to qualify for self-regulation. These conditions require the tribe to
provide "full and complete" fishing regulations, to permit monitoring of off-reservation Indian fishing by the state, and to provide fish catch reports regarding both onreservation and off-reservation catches. 384 F. Supp. at 341. Failure to abide by

these conditions suspends self-regulation. Id. at 340.
166.

Id. at 341.
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Enforcement of new regulations and measurement of 50 percent of
each run are difficult tasks, which undoubtedly will be settled as the
167
parties repeatedly return to the district court.
The remedy formulated in Washington has accomplished two
results. It has established parameters for the treaty fishing right and it
has set the stage for state-Indian cooperation in fisheries resource
utilization and management. The fervor of non-Indian reaction to the
decision has been extreme.' 68 However, when an analysis of the actual
experience with Washington becomes available, this reaction may be
quieted as the public realizes that the Indians are not decimating the
1 69
anadromous fish.
B.

Analysis of Alternatives

It is difficult to analyze an opinion in a vacuum. Perhaps the best
method with which to determine the efficacy of the Boldt decision is
167. The court concluded that it would retain jurisdiction until the controversy is
resolved. 384 F. Supp. at 405, 408. This has meant that the court has remained in
the middle of disputes arising out of the original decision. For example. in the exercise of its continuing jurisdiction over the controversy, the court considered three
Washington State court injunctions against the implementation of regulations promulgated by the Department of Game and the Department of Fisheries. The regulations had been designed. ostensibly, to reduce the non-Indiaa fishery so that the objectives of the Boldt plan could be achieved. Judge Boldt let stand two of the injunctions. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson.
No. 50370 (Thurston County Super. Ct.. Jan. 23, 1975) (injunction of regulation
reducing from 3 to 2 the sports catch daily bag limit), and Washington Kelper's
Ass'n v. Tollefson, No. 50552 (Thurston County Super. Ct., Jan. 23. 1975) (injunction of regulation closing salmon trolling within three mile limit), because the state
had failed to demonstrate that these regulations would significantly increase the number of fish available to treaty fishermen. However, Judge Boldt overturned the injunction in Puget Sound Gill Netters Ass'n v. Tollefson, No. 50757 (Thurston County
Super. Ct., Oct. 18, 1974). In the latter case, the state did demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that the reduction of fishing time for gill netters and purse seiners
in Puget Sound would be an effective regulation. United States v. Washington. No.
9213. at 8-9 (W.D. Wash., Sept. 12, 1974) (mem.).
The Washington Supreme Court is also becoming involved in this controversy. In
Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. Moos, No. 52881 (Thurston County Super. Ct..
Sept. 9, 1975), Judge Alexander invalidated several Department of Fisheries regulations. The Association immediately petitioned the Washington Supreme Court to
stay Judge Alexander's order, but the court denied the stay pending appeal of the
decision. Id., No. 43938 (Wash., Sept. 23, 1975).
168. Sportsmen and commercial fishermen have been in the forefront of public
discontent with the Washington decision. Shortly after Judge Boldt's decision was
handed down, irate sportsmen hung him in effigy, using a fishing net, outside the federal courthouse in Tacoma. See Seattle Times, March 17, 1974. § D, at 8, col. 3.
169. A United States Fish and Wildlife Service survey shows that the tribal catch
was 2.4% of the total (through August) in 1974 (2.0% if the sports catch is included
in the total) compared with 3.5% for 1973. United States v. Washington. No. 9213.
at 4-5 (W.D. Wash.. Sept. 12, 1974) (mem.).
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examination of the possible alternatives. In the Washington case, the
court had, beyond a decision to do nothing, three alternatives to the
approach taken. First, the decision might have been based upon Judge
Boldt's recognition that prior judicial statements were erroneously
based on dictum and that proper construction of treaty language
precluded state regulation, even of off-reservation fishing. As
suggested, this, although the preferable alternative, would have been
impossible. The public reaction to such a decision would have been
overwhelmingly critical. In an area already plagued by racial violence
and long-standing prejudice, the result might have been disastrous. In
addition, such a decision would have been directly contrary to recent
Supreme Court precedent, thereby inviting swift reversal. This alternative merely would have prolonged the litigation process.
A second alternative might have been to proceed by smaller steps.
If an order, based upon the exact language of Puyallup II,170 had
been entered, holding the state regulations to be discriminatory or
unnecessary for conservation, much of the public anguish could have
been avoided. Nevertheless, this alternative also would have
prolonged the already protracted adjudication of treaty fishing rights.
New regulations would have had to have been drafted and the
question presented again. The state's recognition of Indian treaty
would not have been
fishing rights "with all deliberate speed"''
adequately facilitated by this approach.
A third alternative was available. Although unusual as a judicial
remedy, there could have been, in essence, a purchase of the treaty
rights from the tribes. The economic value to the tribes of the seasonal
runs could have been calculated in terms of a price per pound of fish
predicted to be harvested, perhaps redetermined each year. A total
sum representing this value would have been paid to each tribe for its
share, to be divided among tribal members by a predetermined
method.' 7 2 Of course, on-reservation religious and subsistence fishing
could not, and need not, have been eliminated. Other fishing done by the
Indians would have been in accordance with state laws applicable to
all citizens of the state.
170. See text accompanying notes 131-32 supra. The Court in Puyallup H explicitly declined to articulate a method of apportionment. "What formula should be

employed is not for us to propose." 414 U.S.. at 48.
171. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
172.

An ample supply of fish for recreational purposes would have been pre-

served, as well as the accompanying state revenues and license fees.
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There are two reasons militating against such a solution to the
Indian fishing problem. First, such a drastic remedy is not necessary.
Statistics show that from 1950 to 1968 the Indian catch from all
sources remained constant. 17 3 In fact, the Indians' share of the salmon
catch from 1958 to 1967 was only 6 percent of the total in Puget
Sound and 6.5 percent for all of Washington State. 174 There is no
proof this trend has not continued.' 75 If these statistics are sound, it
would be, on the one hand, uneconomical to pay for any greater share
and, on the other hand, inequitable for the tribes to be paid for 7
percent of runs of which they were entitled to harvest up to 50
percent. Second, this alternative might be unacceptable to the Indians.
There would be no pride in "earning a living" by getting a check once
a year roughly equivalent to that which would have been gained from
the actual work. 7 6 Moreover, this approach can be viewed as an attempt to assimilate the Indians by removing a traditional source of
their livelihood, breaking yet another cultural link with the past. For
these reasons, this alternative is probably unworkable.
A final alternative cannot be achieved judicially. Indian treaty
fishing rights are subject to modification, including complete
abrogation, by Congress. If the courts are an unavailing forum,
Congress may be more willing to act upon the complaints of nonIndian fishermen. However, in light of prior unsuccessful attempts to
177
congressionally end Indian treaty fishing rights, this is unlikely.

173. UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY. supra note 9, at 123.
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Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); H.R.J. Res. 48, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963): S.
Res. 170.
171, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). Congress may be more willing to move in the opposite direction by incorporating the treaty fishing provisions into statutes. Depending
on the language of particular statutes, the states may be left without jurisdiction to
regulate. Congressional recognition of the importance of treaty fishing rights to the
tribes is illustrated by 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1970). 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1970) grants
jurisdiction to several states to enforce their criminal laws on reservation lands, but
18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1970) limits that jurisdiction by requiring that state enforcement not "deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band or community of any right.
privilege, or immunity.., with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing .... ." Id.

Indian Treaty Fishing Rights
V.

CONCLUSION

In retrospect, Judge Boldt's plan in Washington appears to provide
the best solution at this time to the problem of off-reservation Indian
fishing. Broad parameters of the off-reservation treaty fishing right
have been established-although a good deal of adjustment and fine
tuning are necessary. The court has provided the avenue for this fine
tuning through continuing jurisdiction and by spurring state-Indian
cooperative interaction. The basis for amicable adjustment has been
laid and should advance as the public outcry diminishes. Based upon
a thorough exploration of the history, sociology and legal principles of
treaty negotiation, a modern definition of the treaty right has also
been formulated. Central to this definition is the conclusion that treaty
language did not restrict the tribal fishing right to the same
prerequisites as non-Indian fishing, but rather granted rights to nonIndians, allowing them to fish at the same sites as Indians. Because
they recognize and are based upon historical realities and legal
precedent, the principles of Washington should endure.
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